《道德情操论》是斯密的伦理学著作，**出版于1759年，斯密去世前共出版过六次。该书创作于斯密的另一本著作《国富论》之前，是斯密反复修订至*满意的作品，其中不仅包含了他在狭义的道德问题上的系统认识，还包含了非常丰富的关于人类社会行为的思想。全书由七卷构成，主要阐释道德情感的本质和道德评价的性质。斯密在该书中继承了哈奇逊的道德感学说和休谟的同情论思想，并形成了自己的道德情感理论。他反对神学家用天启来说明道德的根源，而把他认为是人本性中所有的同情的情感作为阐释道德的基础。他用同情的原理来解释人类正义感和其它一切道德情感的根源，来说明道德评价的性质，并以此为基础表明各种基本美德的特征。斯密在《道德情操论》中所阐述的不少论断都可以作为思想资源引入行为经济学和实验经济学的发展之中。可以说这部篇幅不长的著作对后世的很多领域都产生了重大影响。

导 读 — 001 — Part I Of the Propriety of Action — 001 — Section I Of the Sense of Propriety — 001 — Chap. I Of Sympathy — 001 — Chap. II Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy — 009 — Chap. III Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with our own — 013 — Chap. IV The same subject continued — 017 — Chap. V Of the amiable and respectable virtues — 024 — Section II Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety — 029 — Introduction — 029 — Chap. I Of the Passions which take their origin from the body — 030 — 目 录 002 Chap. II Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination — 036 — Chap. III Of the unsocial Passions — 040 — Chap. IV Of the social Passions — 048 — Chap. V Of the selfish Passions — 050 — Section III Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other — 055 — Chap. I That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned — 055 — Chap. II Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks — 064 — Chap. III Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition — 080 — Part II Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment — 088 — Section I Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit — 088 — Introduction — 088 — 003 Chap. I That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment — 089 — Chap. II Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment — 092 — Chap. III That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it — 095 — Chap. IV Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters — 097 — Chap. V The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit — 099 — Section II Of Justice and Beneficence — 102 — Chap. I Comparison of those two virtues — 102 — Chap. II Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit — 108 — Chap. III Of the utility of this constitution of Nature — 113 — Section III Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions — 122 — Introduction — 122 — 004 Chap. I Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune — 124 — Chap. II Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune — 129 — Chap. III Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments — 140 — Part III Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sen_x005f?timents and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty — 151 — Chap. I Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation — 151 — Chap. II Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise?worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness — 155 — Chap. III Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience — 181 — Chap. IV Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules — 211 — Chap. V Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity — 218 — Chap. VI In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives — 233 — Part IV Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation — 245 — 005 Chap. I Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty — 245 — Chap. II Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation — 256 — Part V Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation — 266 — Chap. I Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity — 266 — Chap. II Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments — 275 — Part VI Of the Character of Virtue — 292 — Introduction — 292 — Section I Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence — 292 — Section II Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People — 301 — Introduction — 301 — 006 Chap. I Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention — 302 — Chap. II Of the order in which Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence — 315 — Chap. III Of universal Benevolence — 325 — Section III Of Self-command — 329 — Conclusion of the Sixth Part — 364 — Part VII Of Systems of Moral Philosophy — 369 — Section I Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments — 369 — Section II Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue — 370 — Introduction — 370 — Chap. I Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety — 371 — Chap. II Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence — 406 — Chap. III Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence — 414 — Chap. IV Of licentious Systems — 423 — 007 Section III Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation — 434 — Introduction — 434 — Chap. I Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love — 435 — Chap. II Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation — 439 — Chap. III Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation — 443 — Section IV Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality — 452 — 术语汇编与简释 — 475