6. Common property regimes can be effective at controlling access to the resource. Most common property regimes are based upon someform of access control and some form of institutional design to regulate use and to minimize the subtractability problem. The literature on common property regimes recognizes that solutions exist through three basic kinds of property rights regimes:l) state property or state governance indicates that rights to the resource are controlled exclusively by government agencies on behalf of all the citizens,2) communal property or common property means that the resource is held by an identifiable community of users who can exclude others and regulate their own use, and 3) .private property refers to a situation in which an individual or a corporate body has the right to exclude others and regulate the use of the resources.
7.Common property regimes as collective resource management systems have been shown to develop when a group of individuals are highly dependent on a resource (s) and when the availability of the resource (s) is uncertain or limited. If the resource problem is repeatedly experienced, such as low yields or no catch, and if it exists within a single community of users, the fishermen are likely to develop a collective institutional arrangement (rights and rules) to deal with the problem. In the face of uncertainty in resource availability, group members are willing to trade off some benefit from individual use of the resource, for the collective assurance that the resource will be used in a more equitable and sustainable manner. Institutions, through rules, provide incentives for the group members to take certain actions to achieve the desired outcome. The development of institutional arrangements requires an investment of time by the members of the community. Coordination and informational meetings are initial aspects of building institutions. The transaction process of developing institutions will have costs. For common property regimes, these costs are part of the collective decision-making process.
8.As Jentoft put it, "how then is co-management to be distinguished from other common property management systems, such as government regulation or community-initiated regulation?" The answer is that comanagement is a middle course between pure state property and pure communal property regimes. The three property rights regimes mentioned above (plus the open access regime or the absence of property rights) are ideal, analytical types-they do not exist in the real world. Rather, resources tend to be held in overlapping combinations of these four regimes. Strictly speaking, pure communal property systems and community-based coastal resource management (CBCRM) are always embedded in state property systems and derive their strength from them. Co-management may involve the recognition and legitimization of traditional or customary local-level manage- ment systems. A certain degree of community-based resource management may be a part of co-management.
9.Fishermen's ability to organize for collective action has a number of prerequisites, essentially involving the question of local institutional arrangements. Not all groups of fishermen have appropriate local institutional arrangements. In such cases, any co-management initiative will start with institution-building. The establishment and suc cessful operation of fisheries co-management can be a complex, longterm, and costly process. The costs for individuals to participate in co-management (time and money) may outweigh the expected benefits. Community organizing, for example, can take from three to five years before a self-sufficient organization is in place, on the basis of cases in the Philippines, and five to ten years on the basis of a case in St. Lucia, West Indies.
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